Overview Of Wilhelm II Foreign Policy

Overview Of Wilhelm II inappropriate PolicyHistoriographical Debate War offense Clause of conformity of Versailles created popular perception that Germany was to blame for WWI. You should be state of strugglefarefaree much(prenominal) a de nameinist stance you must remember that Wilhelm II pre arrayd everyplace 24 years of peace before contend broke turn come in in 1914.In the 1920s and early 1930s, the general appeasement and pliant policies of the western powers modified this perception much or less(a)what. Germany was depictn, in this termination, as having stumbled into war.However, by the modern 1930s Hitlers aggression was qualification people re- hark back, again, the nature of German opposed insurance policy, and the extent to which it was inherently intricacyist and aggressive.In 1961 Fritz Fischer published his famous budge down (Germanys Aims in the origin World War), which once again suggested that Germany bore strand responsibility for the outbr eak of WWI, and that this had been systematically plotted for since 1911. You must make some decision on this, after studying the leaven, as you will be stretch forth judgment to know about, and comment on, the Fischer deal.Wilhelms unlike policy can be sub secernated/periodised into oddity of the Bismarckian system 1890-1897 egression of Weltpolitik 1897-1907Descent into war 1907-1914End of the Bismarckian systemLapse of reinsurance treaty with RussiaResulted in dual compact between France and Russia 1894.This hamper between Russia and France was perhaps unavoidable. Caprivi had to make a strategical decision between Germanys bond certificate with Austria-Hungary and the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. He at that placefore allowed the Reinsurance Treaty to lapse, which pushed France towards Russia anyway, proveing in the Franco Russian union of 1894.Attempts to foster a British alliance failed first dark blue legality emerged 1897 antagonistic competition with Britis h pass along1897 Italy joined Austro-German allianceConcluding remarks in 1897 Germany fairly safe. Alliances existed which excluded her and there was the potential drop risk of encirclement, only when neither France nor Russia real wanted conflict with a formidable military power such as Germany Russia couldnt afford it (pre-industrial) and France had purplish interests to protect.However, H Holger pointed out that where foreign policy lies in the slews of an idiosyncratic there is always a risk that their personality will cast affairs.Bismarck had played chess, Wilhelm II played poker2. Emergence of Weltpolitik 1897-1907Fritz Fischer saw 1897 as a round point in Germany foreign policy. This was mainly because of the change magnitude role of the Kaisers men in politics Tirpitz, Posadowsky, Bulow you perplex already met, plus Holstein at the Foreign Office and von Miquel, the Prussian pay Minister.Term used by Bulow, Wilhelm II and HollwegNot an easy term Basically 2 f orms sparingal imperialism. This was informal and was based on the elaboration of trading markets rather than political control.Political expansion / lebensraum, either overseas or in Europe.Economic imperialism was favoured by industry, who wanted new markets for goods. Economic expansion had been pursued earlier in Wilhelms reign, for example, into the near East, which baneened Russian grain trading interests there, and prompted a Russian move towards France.There were some industrialists who favoured political expansion, because it would give them direct access to raw materials. However, most industrialists like mere access to markets which stinting imperialism would generate.Political expansion was favoured by the Kaiser, certainly, therefore mainly by the mittelstand (lower middle class) and agricultural workers, who saw their decreasing economic location in Germany and wanted opportunity for emigration and new start.This nonion was placely reflected in internal migrat ion and was such internal colonization (mainly of eastern territories) was facilitated by the Settlement Commission and Expropriation constabulary of 1908 (this can be seen as extension of Bismarcks policies), but greater horizons were desired. In fact, G Geiss has argued that weltopolitikcame into existence as a red herring of the belief classes to distract the middle ruling classes from complaisant and political problems at home.Obviously, the legions also favoured political expansion, as this would in turn sum up their role, status and solve on government.Germany had entered the pudding st unrivalled Race lately. She had acquired overseas colonies in Africa by 1890 (Togoland, the Cameroons, East Africa). By 1899 she acquired pacific islands of Samoa, the Carolines and Marianas, and a strip of the cut Congo in 1911 as part of the Moroccan Crisis deal. However, n sensation of these colonies were profitable. For example, South-West Africa didnt cover the costs of admini stration, even once diamonds were found in 1908.Informal empire was much more lucrative, e.g Latin America and south east Europe. Government, banks and businesses cooperated well, for example, in providing financial backing for the terminus of a Baghdad to Berlin railway, which would open up access to the oil militia of the Ottoman Empire. This cooperation of multiple interest groups is Fischers hallmark of Weltopolitik in action.Impact of imperialism ask an increase in military attitude to pursue. The role of the force in foreign policy has been much debated.Porter and Armour argue that it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the the States in Wilhelmine Germany was a state within a state G Craig also shares this view.Must remember that there was no German troops, except in war time. There existed four armies of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg, Prussian was the biggest.However, since 1874 the Army compute only reviewed by Reichstag every 7 years Se ptennat. After 1893, increased to once every 5 years. Army therefore financially independent.Plus, since 1883, the Army had direct access to Emperor. The Kaiser was personally very militaristic and had natural kindliness for the armys aims. The international situation was increasingly tense ancient hostility of France exacerbated by imperial competition, the growing threat of Russia, brought about by economic competition. This gave the army an additional reason to push for expansion. In addition, the army chiefs sold the army to Wilhelm as the last blind drunkhold against socialism and revolution.The status of the army as above the law was proven by the Zabern incident. Although Hollweg received rough intervention from the Reichstag over the incident, no action was taken against the army officers knobbed. In fact, there was widespread sympathy for the army M Kitchen goes so far as to argue that the army was one of the most popular institutions in the fleck Reich. This is possib ly linked to the fact that the juncture of Germany was largely owed to the Army, who had created the state without bruise and was seen to be able to defend it in similar fashion.Nevertheless, Germanys army not significantly increased until army laws 1912-13This was because-army officers mainly Junker aristocrats didnt want increased conservative element in officer class which would have been inevitable result of expansion in armed forces-the army didnt have the ability to teach a larger army effectively.Descent into war 1907-1914You could be for habituated for mentation that was must have been inevitable, if strategies to cope with a two front war had been developing since the late 1890s (even though Schleiffens think wasnt made mankind till 1905). However, the situation in 1900 was not entirely unstable. Yes, Russia was growing in strength and in hostility to Germany, as a result of economic competition in the near east. Certainly, Britain and France were becoming concerned about Germanys gallant ambitions. Yet, in 1900, even though Russia and France were allies since 1894, this threat was balanced by the counterweight of British neutrality. In addition, none of these powers were interested in war if it could be avoided Russia didnt have the might, and Britain and France had priorities elsewhere. So, why did war break out in 1914 and why has Germany often been held responsible?It could be argued that the biggest misreckoning in German policy was Tirpitz risk theory. He thought that if Germany built a navy to rival Britain, Britain would be intimidated and would seek an alliance with Germany. Bulows views compounded this miscalculation. He believed that a conflict between Britain and Russia was inevitable (?). He preferred to side with the Russians, but only once he was sure they would win. So, for Bulow, building a navy to rival Britains would help Germany maintain a free hand where they could preserve good relations with both nations and await t he outcome, which would be Britains defeat, at which point having a tidy navy would enable Germany to supplant Britain as the major world powerThe reality of Britains reaction was the opposite to what Tirpitz and Bulow anticipated. The Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 made Britain nervous and hostile. As a result, she sought alliance with France and Russia kind of. In 1904 the Entente Cordiale was signed by Britain and France.In 1905 the German attempt to demoralise Anglo-French relations by provoking the first Moroccan crisis backfired. Spain had granted France a virtual protectorate in Morocco. In direct take exception, the Kaiser landed in Morocco in 1905. It seems likely that the Kaiser wanted to test the Entente, to see if Britain, in particular, would tin Frances claim. She did. The attempt to divide France and Britain had failed spectacularly. The resulting Algericas conference, called to resolve the crisis, was a diplomatic failure for Germany in 1906 Germany was forced to ac cept a French protectorate in Morroco. In addition, Bulows attempt to divide Britain and Russia also failed. Bulow attempted to stir up perturb between Britain (Japans ally since 1902) and Russia during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. Both parties were annoyed. By 1907 Russia and Britain had joined a Triple Entente with their mutual ally, France.Moreover, Britain made it clear that she was not prepared to allow Germany to dominate the seas, and entered a naval race. Even Bulow, in 1908, voice his reservations with existing policy and suggested that Britain may be able to blockade the German navy in her harbours, should conflict arise. This would render Germanys expensive navy useless. Bulow only suggested to Tirpitz that it may be worth investing rather in change coastal fortifications and creating a strong submarine fleet. Tirpitz disagreed. It is interesting to speculate on how differently the first world war would have turned out had investment been made along the lines Bu low suggestedYet, even at this point, Europe was hitherto about 7 years away from war Germany could have change Britain had she removed the threat of a naval race and limited her imperial beard ambitions. Yet Bulow persisted in his policy. The naval laws of 1906 and 1908 prompted Britain to build the Dreadnought a battleship more powerful than anything the Germans heldGermany indeed supported the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, which only served to anger Russia, to de-stabilise the Balkans and, at the least, to irritate Britain and France on Russias behalf.The appointment of Hollweg in 1909 was a possibility for rapprochement. He actively sought an Anglo-German alliance. However, the Kaiser, Tirpitz and the army continually thwarted him. In addition, Tirpitzs propaganda techniques had created such popular support for naval expansion that it became impossible for Hollweg to back down from this policy without losing prevalent support, particularly given the st alemate that existed in the Reichstag.In 1911 France contravened the Algeciras agreement and Germany was awarded a strip of the French Congo in compensation. But this still damaged Anglo-German relations, as Britain came to the support of France against what she saw as German bullying. The alliances were crystallizing into military camps.The Balkan wars of 1912-13 were a further de-stabilising influence, as the crumbling Ottoman Empire created a power vacuum in the region, which brought Austrian and Russian interests (and, therefore, those of their allies) into direct conflict.The Kaiser called a war council in 1912, resulting in an increase in the size of the army in a law of 1913. However, no real war planning was in evidence. In addition, Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, was still pushing peace talks as late as 1914 (although this doesnt necessarily imply similar German desire for rapprochement).Was Germany foreign policy the result of domestic policy?This is sometime s called social imperialism where expansion is the result of an attempt to distract people from problems at home.VR Berghahn argues that Germanys foreign policy was dictated by rapid industrialisationIf one considers sammlungspolitik the alliance of steel and rye (industry and agriculture) from 1897 in their joint bid to compression socialism, one can perhaps see that domestic issues were perhaps pressing complete to warrant distractionHowever, this is a somewhat simplistic argument and you should quip a variety of alternative causes for Germanys foreign policy such as-the power of the army-Wilhelms personality-industrial interests (in their own right, rather than as a challenge to socialism)-competitive imperial climate of the time-recent unification set militaristic tone for nation and also encouraged expansion as mover of further consolidating status of nation in Europe-anything else you can think ofSo, was Germany set on war in 1914?4 interpretationsGermany deliberately u nleashed war for continental and even world hegemony Fischer (not born out by the evidence)Hollweg enkindle a diplomatic crisis which he knew might lead to war, because he was more afraid of Germanys closing off than he was of war. (unlikely, not really much evidence that anyone was concerned about isolation, even after the Moroccan crises)All nations were evenly responsible for the outbreak of war (wishy-washy, fence-sitting argument avoid)War wasnt planned or pre- opinionated, but was an acceptable option as the German government expected war to be both short-lived and winnable (very plausible the Kaiser was influenced by the armys advice, the army believed they could win as they had a great track record and a now expanded force, and the chaotic nature of the Wilhelmine government meant that Hollwegs moderating influence would not be heard))Porter and Armour argue that the German government, by 1914, was looking for a chance to break out of encirclement, confident of its stre ngth and determined to seize on the first suitable pretext for demonstrating thisHollweg continually maintained that German expansion required agreement with Britain and that, if he could disassemble on Russia over an issue which didnt involve British interests, he would be successful, and war would be avoided.The assassination of France Ferdinand provided just such an opportunity. Russia came to the aid of Serbia against an un collect Austrian ultimatum. It is true that Germany was secretly complicit with Austria in drafting the terms of the ultimatum. This could be seen as deliberate provocation of war.The terms of the Triple Alliance allowed Germany to see Russian mobilization as a threat to Austria, and therefore an designer to defend her. The Schlieffen Plan, with its necessary killer blow to France to be delivered first, required speed. thus once Russian mobilization began, war in Europe was inevitable. On 1 heroic Germany declared war on Russia. On third August Germany d eclared war on France. On 4 August Britain reacted to the violation of Belgian neutrality and declared war on Germany.So, it seems that war in 1914 was really little more than a ludicrous miscalculation on the part of Germany. Agree or disagree? The choice, as ever, is yoursTimeline of Foreign Policy, 1890-19141890 Bismarck is dismissed. Germany refuses to renew the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, who therefore starts to look to France for friendship.1891 Franco-Russian Entente Germany anticipates a war on two fronts and draws up the Schlieffen Plan. Looks to Britain for an alliance.1894 Franco-Russian Alliance confirms Germanys fears she now looks more to Britain.1896 Kruger Telegram Germany tries to show Britain how degage she is to frighten her into an alliance, but merely infuriates Britain.1898 First Naval Law hopes to scare Britain into an alliance. Germany demands a high price for her friendship, cogitate that British alliances with France and Russia are unlikely due to t heir ancient enmity. Therefore Germany rejects Britains alliance propositions, thinking that they are too favourable to Britain.1899 The Fashoda incident modifys Anglo-French Relations (or so Germany thinks). Encourages Germany to demand a still higher price. Britain determines isolated.1900 Second Naval Law attempts to frighten Britain and fails.1901 Anglo-German talks once again collapse.1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty France doesnt want to be drawn into a Russo-Japanese war (and therefore have to fight Britain) due to the Franco-Russian alliance, so she seeks agreement with Britain. Germany begins to feel uneasy.1903 Murzsteg Agreement Austria-Hungary and Russia agree to maintain the status quo in the Balkans for 5 years. Serbian pro-Habsburg monarchy overthrown in favour of a pro-Romanov one signifies beginning of Austro-Hungarian enmity for Serbia. Austro-Russian relations remain tense. Edward VII makes a overbearing visit to Paris.1904 Entente Cordiale Alliance of friendship bet ween France and Britain. Germany feels increasingly isolated and sees the chances of an Anglo-German alliance diminishing. Dogger Bank incident after Russo-Japanese declared Germany hopes it will aggravate Anglo-Russian relations, but France keeps them on good terms. Defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war. Russia turns back to the Balkans instead of the Far East for expansion and Britain no longer sees Russia as a threat and is therefore more willing to ally with her.1905 Germany sees this and arranges the Bjorko Treaty with Russia, but it is incompatible with Franco-Russian alliance and so is rejected. Germany tries to split the Entente Cordiale in the Moroccan Crisis, but only succeeds in revealing the weaknesses of the Triple Alliance (as Italy abandon her), streng consequentlying the Entente and bringing Britain and Russia closer as they are on the same side for once. Germany falls back even more on Austria-Hungary.1907 Anglo-Russian Entente confirms Germanys fears of being encircled and she relies even more on Austria-Hungary. The trinity Naval Law does little to worry Britain.1908 Daily Telegraph phrase by Wilhelm fails to persuade Britain that Germany is friendly and that her naval building is purely defensive. newfangled Turk Revolution makes Austria-Hungary raring(predicate) to annex Bosnia before the Turks become too strong to resist. Hence The Bosnian Crisis Germanys virtual isolation forces her to support Austria-Hungary, which has the unpleasant side-effects of(a) making Austria-Hungary more aggressive(b) Increasing the Ententes enmity towards Germany.Russia is diplomatically defeated and is determined never to be again. Austria-Hungary becomes more cocky. Germanys support for Austria-Hungary now becomes certain.1911 Agadir Crisis Shows how Germany was more eager to extend her influence than to improve her foreign relations. Once again her isolation and her unpopularity are brought home to her.1912 Balkan Wars make a strong Serbia Austria -Hungary is determined to crush her before she gets too strong.1913 Britain, France, Russia and Germany all make military improvements.1914 Assassination of Franz Ferdinand gives Austria-Hungary an free to attack Serbia.TasksA. Research If you are working as a group, divide the main pillow slips (highlighted in bold) between yourselves. Each person should research their event in more detail using any sources available to them, and then report back to the group with either a handout or a presentation.B. Analysis(i) What was the main turning point in international relations between 1890-1914? Explain your answer.(i) To what extent can Wilhelm II be blamed for the outbreak of the First World War?FAQA Germany survival GEra of Wilhelm IIRel between Wii Foreign and Domestic Policy SWK ex.pdfDiscussionIdentifyWhen was Schlieffens war plan unveiled? 1905Name the historian most associated with the theory that Germanys planned aggression was primarily responsible for the outbreak of WWI F ritz FischerIn what years did Germany pass Army Laws?1912-13In what years did Germany pass Navy Laws?18981900DescribeHow was the Schlieffen plan supposed to work?-as soon as Russia mobilised, Germany to attack France. This was because Russia would take 6 weeks to fully mobilize and, if G could defeat F in that 6 week period, she could avoid war on 2 fronts. Attack on F would be through Belgium, in violation of Belgian neutrality protected by GB. G didnt think GB would get involved despite treaty, as GB only had small army and didnt really want to involve herself in European affairs. If G could defeat F quickly, may be no point in GB mobilizing. as well G didnt really see GBs army as much of a threat, so was risk worth taking. G to march round the git of Paris and seize capital before F troops could diminish from Maginot line forts. Once capital secured, country defeated. Holding force could then be left and main G army returned to east to fight Russia.What was Tirpitz risk theory ?-if Germany built a navy to rival Britain, Britain would be intimidated and would seek an alliance with GermanyWhat is H Holgers quote on the remainder between the FP of Bismarck and Wilhelm?Bismarck had played chess, Wilhelm II played pokerHow have Porter and Armour described the army in Wilhelms Germany?-state within a stateExplainwhy was the army so powerful?-financially independent since-had ear of Kaiser since..-Kaisers personal interest in militarism-public support -since unification and also because Tirpitz Navy League (1898) created a propaganda campaign to mobilize public supportWhy did the size of the army not really increase until 1912-13?-army elites didnt want increase in middle-class presence-no facilities for trainingWhy did Britains hostility towards Germany grow?-Tirpitz risk theory Navy Laws of 1898, 1900-imperial competition-irritation at Germanys meddling during the Russo-Japanese war-Germanys support for A-Hs annexation of Bosnia 1908Why was Hollweg unable to get an Anglo-German alliance?-thwarted by military interests-public support for militarizationWhy did Russia feel threatened by Germany?-economic competition for grain markets in near east-German support for Austrian destabilization of/expansion into the BalkansWhy is Wilhelms foreign policy in the years preceeding WWI such a hot topic for debate amongst historians?-because of the later aggression displayed by Hitler.in trying to understand the nazi regime, historians try to decide whether Hitler was an aberration or whether aggressive expansionism of Hitler part of a wider slip in German history.Why does Fischer see 1897 as a turning point in Germanys Foreign Policy?-Kaisers men in cay positionsHow could the Morocco crisis of 1905 be seen as an attempt to challenge the Entente?The Kaisers direct challenge to French interests there was a deliberate attempt to see if GB would support French claimAnalyseWas Weltpolitik a genuine threat to peace?How serious a threat was encirclemen t to Germany in the period 1904-1914?Was Germany seeking war in 1914?